WASHINGTON FOST

## Approved For Release 2001/03/04 CIA-RDP80-01601R00

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### The Change at CIA

There are such strict limits to what is knowable about the Central Intelligence Agency and its workings that any discussion of Mr. Ilelms' departure from the directorship and Mr. Schlesinger's appointment to replace him must necessarily rest on a comparatively small store of information. Even so, one or two things are plain. And chief among these is the fact, evident from what is known about the two men themselves, that one highly qualified and eminently capable official is being replaced by another.

Riehard Helms has spent most of his professional life in intelligence work, and he has acquired a reputation among those qualified to judge, as a man of great honesty and tough-mindedness. The term "tough-minded" in this connection can only summon forth imaginary zither music for some people and visions of grown men running around endlessly shoving each other under trains. But Mr. Helms-unflappable, personally disinterested, and beyond the reach of political or idcological pressures where his judgment is eoncerned-earned his reputation for tough-mindedness in an intellectual sense. As Agency Director, he has been far less a public figure or celebrity than some of his predecessors—Allen Dulles, for example, or John McCone-evidently preferering to maintain a certain becoming obscurity. He has worked very effectively with some of his overseers on the Hill. And, if the leaked (not by CIA) material, such \*as the Pentagon Papers, that has been appearing in the press is any guide, he and his Ageney have also served their executive branch leaders with some distinction. One gcts the impression that from the presumed efficaey

of bombing the North Vietnamesc to the presumed necessity of responding to every wild surmise of what the Russians were up to in nuclear weapons development, Mr. Helms has offered a practical, dispassionate and rigorously honest—if not always popular—view.

That the Congress will be pushing for some greater degree of responsiveness from the CIA in the eoming session seems pretty certain. And there also is at least a chanec that internal bureaueratic difficulties at the Agency will require some managerial rearrangements. In a way, solely because he eomes to CIA from outside (not from up the ranks), James Schlesinger may be specially suited to take on both. But he has other qualifeiations. At the Rand Corporation in California, Mr. Schlesinger did analytic work that gave him more than a passing familiarity with the intelligence estimating business. At the Budget Bureau—as it was then known -in the early days of the Nixon administration he proved himself a very astute, not to say downright coldeyed, serutinizer of military budget requests. His brief term at the AEC was notable in several respects. Mr. Sehlesinger bucked the pressure of the atomic energy establishment to insist that the AEC take note of and respond to the claims of its eeological crities. And he attempted to push the agency back from its political role toward the more disinterested service role it was meant in the first place to fulfill. He, like Mr. Helms, is demonstrably a man of talent, dedication and impressive intellect. We should have been content to see them stay on in their present jobs. But if Mr. Helms is to leave the Central Intelligence Agency, we think Mr. Schlesinger is a first class choice to replace him.

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CHICAGO, ILL. SUN Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01

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## li's official: Schlesinger new

By Thomas B. Ross Sun-Times Bureau

WASHINGTON -- The White House announced Thursday that Atomic Energy Commission Chairman James R. Schlesinger will replace Richard M. Helms as director of the Central Intelligence Agen-· cy. The announcement was made in Key Biscayne, Fla.

Press secretary Ronald L. Ziegler sald President Nixon intends to nominate Belins as ambassador to Iran.

The Sun-Times disclosed the Schlesinger appointment three weeks ago and reported Helms' transfer to Iran in its Thursday editions.

Ziegler portrayed Helms' de-

parture from the CIA as voluntary. He said Helms told Mr. Nixon he wanted to abide by a policy he established that CIA officials retire at age 60. Helms will be 60 in March.

On the other hand, friends and associates of Helms indicated he was leaving the agency reluctantly after 25 years of intelligence work.

Ziegler conceded there had been some differences over Helms' assessment of Soviet missile deployment and the North Vietnamese offensive last spring. But he insisted it would be "off the mark" to suggest any White House unhappiness with Helms.

He praised Helms' "dedi-

White House was "totally satisfied" with his performance.

bi disclosing the Schlesinger appointment on Dec. 2, The Sun-Times reported that national security affairs adviser Henry A. Kissinger had directed a series of complaints against the CIA's work under helms, particularly about its Intelligence reports prior to the North Vietnamese offensive.

There have also been indications that Mr. Nixon felt Helms had not kept a tight enough rein on the CIA's spending. Schlesinger, former assistant director of the Office of Management and Budget, will be expected to enforce cated service" and said the greater financial discipline on the \$5 billion a year budget of the CIA and the other Intelligence agencies.

Schlesinger, 43, is a native of New York City and a summa cum laude graduate of Harvard where he also took his! PhD.

He was named head of the AEC last year and quickly came under criticism by both the environment and oil lobbles for promoting nuclear power plants.

Helms, who was named head of the CIA in 1966, is a career intelligence operative who moved to the agency on its inception in 1917 after wartime service in the Office of Strategic Services.

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#### Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP8

LOS ANGELOS TIMES 2 2 DEC 1972

STATINTL

THE ROOM REMOUT

# Ex-Agent Blows Cla

BY LEWIS YABLONSKY

CIA: The Myth and the Madness by Patrick J. Methyey (Saturday Review Press) \$6.95)

The CIA has generally created an image of daring, competent, resourceful and well-armed men, darting through exotic alleys, living in lush botels, in countries around the world in pursuit of information vital to the nation's security.

This image is totally blown by this comprehensive look at the CLA, written by a man who was an

Times Book critic Robert Kirsch is an vacation, Today's guest reviewer is Lewis Yablonsky.

agent assigned to a variety of posts for 14 years, From McGarvey's point of view: "The intelligence community is a bureaucratic morass, a fragmented, disjoinfed effort in which no one seems responsible for momentous decisions. where vested interests are coldly played off against one another, where men of varied expertise stifle the unorthodox and ont for wretched balf-measures of compromises so weekened by consensus that they would be better not taken. at all."

He details the broad parameters of incompetence and the absurd, For example, in one adventuresome exper of the CIA, he describes how a tesm of agents stole a sample of King Forwek's urine. Their object was to determine Tarouk's state of health.

Liver Samples

In another slightly recording ited protect, a CIA felood of McGarvey as element to Hong Kong routinely collected liver samples from eather to the mission or directly from an ord woman betcher in a first Kong slaughterfrom a. The

liver was packed in dry his and chipped to Washington. The purpose was to detect nuclear fallout over mainland China.

The CIA has, according to McGarvey, often provided ridiculous and Costly intelligence; as for example in the planning of

the American raids on the Son Tay Prisoner of War Camp in North Victoria. Acting on CIA intelligence, the American Army, with the approval of the secretary of defense and President Nison, stormed this prison comp to free American prisoners, it proved to be ease of America's most ridiculous blunders — since there were no American prisoners in San Tay.

#### Kennedy Aura

Another dendly blunder of CIA intelligence was their erroneous assessments of the strength of the Victnamese Communist forces in South Vietnam. The CLA provided information that had a direct influence on Americon fall tray strategy and, uitimately, on the number or American lives jost in Victionia, According to Me-Garvey, "clad the problem. been haveled intelligently, about 20,000 American ly's could have been  $\mathcal{S} Y Y \mathcal{S} \mathcal{O}^{1/\alpha}$ 

McGarvey hegan his work for the CIA during an optimistic period in its

and the country's history "This was the time of the aura of John Kennedy; the rhetoric; the glitter of Schlesingers, Hilsmans and Galbraiths; the gay poolside parties and the glamor of Georgetown; mad government service in Washington, the only respectable place for young men to be after college and service hitches, I cried at J.F.R.'s inaugural address. His 'Ask not what your country can do for you! grabbed me and hundreds of guys like me."

It took 14 years for him to arrive at a point of despair and disgust with the system and his job in it. He saw the phenomenon of the "burned out" intelligence officer, or the spy who came in from the cold, as a real problem that was accepted blandly as part of the game. "Bureaucracy, conformity, and paper mill are more meaningful power phrases to an intelligent professional than coup d'ètat. clandestine operations, or even spy."

Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000300350002-2